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Abstract
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (AEVA 2018) received Royal Assent in July 2018 as
the UK's first piece of insurance legislation for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAV). The
legislation clearly only regulates vehicles of higher autonomy, that is vehicles which are 'capable
of...driving themselves'.  Interestingly,  these vehicles are currently not available on public roads,
meaning that the legislation is predictive of future challenges. Moreover, the legislation is rather
broad, with an absence of precise definitions or application: such breadth is clearly to ensure that
the  legislation  remains  connected  to  the  technology  in  the  future.  The  UK  has  clearly  been
proactive in its approach; however, concerns are evident around the fact that the UK, in its attempt
to legislate ahead of the arrival of the technology, is likely to cause confusion due to the unclear
nature of the AEVA 2018's provisions. 
Both the issues of regulatory connection and proactive law are distinct areas of academic study
which have not, as of yet been explored together in relation to a piece of legislation. The study of
these issues in relation to the AEVA 2018 in this paper will further discuss the difficulty in balancing
these. This paper will explore some of the insurance and liability difficulties with the current AEVA
2018. It will further uniquely discuss solutions to these challenges taking into account regulatory
connection and proactive law. 
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1. Introduction 
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 (AEVA 2018) [2] received Royal Assent on July 2018.
It  provided  key  development  to  the  law  of  insurance  and  liability  relating  to  Connected  and
Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) [3] in light of significant challenges envisaged by the legislature. The
AEVA 2018 states that CAVs require insurance under a 'single insurance' policy covering both the
driver and the vehicle. Where an accident occurs as a result of the CAV  'driving itself',  [4] the
insurer is required to compensate the third party, although the insurer can recover from the CAV
manufacturer or person responsible for the accident. [5] This is an attempt to provide the answer
to the 'who is liable?' question, which is discussed prevalently not just in academic literature but
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also across the media. [6] 
CAVs are seen as disruptive innovation, [7] particularly prone to the so called 'pacing problem', [8]
which,  'like the 'challenge of regulatory connection'...is an attempt to understand the struggle to
'keep up' with technology'. [9] The legislature has stated its awareness of the difficulties regarding
timing for CAVs and will continue to monitor the growth of technology and challenges to be faced.
[10] Notably, one of the ways where the AEVA 2018 has sought to ensure that it is connected to
the  technology,  whilst  not  hampering  innovation,  is  through  ensuring  that  the  legislative
framework allows greater flexibility for the legislature to adapt to the technology as it develops.
For  example  through  the  introduction  of  vague  definitions  such  as  'automated  vehicle'  and
'accident'.  Where the technology develops in a way which is not predicted, there is  at  least  a
possibility that the AEVA 2018 may continue to remain connected. However, recent discussion by
academics such as Helena Haapio [11] and most notably the European Council [12] focuses on the
need for greater proactivity (the 'proactive law' approach) and legislative certainty in all areas of
law,  providing  solutions  before  legal  challenges  arise  and  consequently  ensuring  certainty.
Arguably,  the introduction of  imprecise legislative frameworks conflicts  with the proactive  law
theory [13] through the removal of certainty, which is inevitably detrimental.
This  article  will  analyse the  AEVA 2018,  and how it has addressed some of  the insurance and
liability challenges relating to CAVs. Both proactive law and regulatory connection will be analysed,
along with the AEVA 2018's compatibility with these. Moreover, this article will uniquely provide
some solutions to some of  the challenges in the  AEVA 2018,  taking into account  the need to
comply  with  regulatory  connection  and  proactive  law.  This  article  will  therefore  provide  an
important contribution to this field of study. Whilst this article is focussed primarily on UK law, it
will, in places, provide a comparator to other jurisdictions, particularly some US states, because
they have provided a slightly different approach in terms of definitions.
2. The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 
The  AEVA 2018 is an attempt by the legislature to ensure at least some certainty for accident
victims,  vehicle  users,  manufacturers,  (and  potentially  those  who  are  in  the  manufacturing
process) and insurers in light of the insurance and liability challenges predicted for CAVs, the most
significant being manufacturer or driver liability to victims when a CAV is involved in a collision. For
conventional  motor  vehicles,  the  Road  Traffic  Act  1988 (RTA  1988)  requires  'users' of  motor
vehicles to obtain third party motor insurance to cover their liability to third parties for damage
caused. [14] Where the vehicle user is liable to another due to their negligence, the user's insurer
is obliged to compensate the third party victim. [15] Where there is no insurance in place for the
user,  or  the  vehicle  cannot  be  identified,  the  Motor  Insurers'  Bureau  (MIB)  is  in  place  to
compensate the third party. [16] 
In relation to CAVs, the manufacturer, or the developer of the automated system could have been
liable in accidents concerning level  4 and 5 vehicles  [17] directly to the consumer for  damage
caused by their vehicle malfunction under Section 2 (2) (a) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987
(CPA  1987),  [18] as  the  producer  of  the  defective  product.  [19] However,  there  was  not  an
obligation under theCPA 1987 or the RTA 1988 for the manufacturer of the entire product or part
of the product, to be covered by third party insurance for damage caused by vehicle defect, as 'the
UK motor vehicle insurance model is based on insuring the driver of the vehicle, rather than the
vehicle itself'. [20] With the transfer of control from user to the vehicle in later stages of autonomy
(levels 4 and 5 of the Society of Automotive Engineer (SAE) levels), the absence of compulsory
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insurance  cover  for  the above was problematic.  Moreover,  there  was  uncertainty  surrounding
borderline cases on determining who was liable, for example in relation to where control of the
vehicle  is  shared  between the  vehicle  itself  and  the  user  (such  as  in  the  handover  process),
meaning that victims would have been subject to disputes between insurers and manufacturers
(and/or component manufacturers of CAVs) as to who was liable for a particular accident. The
AEVA 2018 does not seek to solve disputes between manufacturers and insurers, but rather to
ensure  that  victims  are  not  caught  up  in  these  disputes.  Product  liability  insurance  was  the
originally preferred option for the legislature; [21] however, there were numerous incompatibilities
between the system and third party insurance. For example, there would be no guarantee that
manufacturers could not use defences against victims under the rules of product liability, such as
the 'state of the art' (also known as the development risk) defence. [22] The defence is currently
permissible  under  section  4  (1)  (e)  of  the  CPA  1987,  allowing  the  manufacturer  to  avoid
compensation  if  they  can  prove:  "That  the  state  of  scientific  and  technical  knowledge at  the
relevant time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in
question might be expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they
were under his control". As noted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Commission v United
Kingdom, [23] 'in  order  for  the  relevant  scientific  and  technical  knowledge  to  be  successfully
pleaded against the producer, that knowledge must have been accessible at the time when the
product in question was put into circulation' . Moreover, it is important to note that knowledge
here is interpreted rather widely including not just the producer of the product, but also in terms
of knowledge generally.  [24] In  Colin Gee and others v Depuy International Limited, The Depuy
Pinnacle Metal on Metal Hip Litigation Another [25] the Honourable Mrs Justice Andrews stated:
'Although at this stage of the proceedings I am not concerned with the merits of any development
risk defence raised by DePuy, s.4(1)(e) is relevant, to the extent that the word "defect" must be
interpreted consistently  in that section and the earlier  sections of the Act in which it  appears.
Whilst  that  (development risk)  defence should  not  be interpreted in  a  manner  that  would  re-
introduce the need for proof of fault by the back door, it is equally important that the Act should
not be interpreted in a manner which unjustifiably circumscribes the defence, to the detriment of
the producer.' [26] 
A further challenge in relation to the original approach taken by the CCAV was that, 'claims can
only be made against a product liability policy during the first ten years of a product's lifespan' .
[27] Meaning, that any claims after this time period would not be compensated. The eventual
solution  within  the  AEVA  2018 provides  that  rather  than  separate  product  liability  insurance
covering  the  manufacturer  for  vehicle  fault,  both  product  and  driver  are  covered by  a  single
insurance  policy.  The  AEVA  2018 does  not  comprehensively  regulate  all  insurance  challenges
relating to CAVs. For example, as noted by the Law Commission (LC) 'It (AEVA 2018) is not intended
to allocate final responsibility for the accident'. [28] Under the section 5 (1) of the AEVA 2018, the
insurer can reclaim any compensation paid from, 'any other person liable to the injured party'. This
seemingly  has  the  manufacturer  in  mind,  although  does  not  provide  the  route  to  doing  so,
meaning that recovery is likely to arise from current routes such as product liability. The  AEVA
2018 further expressly states that recovery can also come from the vehicle owner, if  software
updates are not installed. [29] The AEVA 2018 therefore does not clarify the process in which the
insurer could claim against the responsible party, nor the defences that could be used against the
insurer, for example by the manufacturer. [30] This is governed, as noted by the LC, 'either under
the 1987 (Consumer Protection) Act, negligence or (where the damage was sustained by a buyer)
in contract '. [31] The LC further note, at paragraph 6.108 that:
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'During  initial  discussions,  insurers  suggested  that  different  insurance  companies  would  take
different approaches. Some may enter into business arrangements with manufacturers, and will
therefore be reluctant to become embroiled in litigation with their business partners. Others may
take the view that the benefits of litigation outweigh the costs, and that a more litigious approach
would enable them to keep premiums low' [32] 
This  follows from the  government response  to  the 'Pathways  to  Driverless  Cars'  consultation,
where the idea for a single insurer system was mooted, it was noted that, 'over time we expect
insurers  and manufacturers  will  develop processes to handle most recovery claims quickly  and
easily'.  [33] Further, the LC in their  preliminary consultation were reluctant to interfere in the
relationship between the insurer and manufacturer (and others). It notes that litigation would be a
'commercial matter'.  [34] Whereas such a commercial matter can, to some extent, be decided by
already existing processes such as through the CPA 1987 or through negligence, this may be quite
difficult.  In relation to negligence, whilst a duty of care between a manufacturer and user can
usually  be  found,  [35] there  are  a  number  of  other  challenges,  surrounding  whether  the
manufacturer acted below the standard of care required.  [36] In relation to the  CPA 1987 , the
extent to which a product is determined, and consequently whether a software manufacturer can
be liable to the insurer is currently uncertain, as whether the  CPA 1987 applies to software is
unclear. [37] It seems that the generally under UK law, product does not go as far as to encompass
software which is introduced 'over the air' but may cover software that is introduced in hardcopy
form, for example if provided on a disk. [38] Nevertheless, even if software can fall within product,
the insurer would still be required to prove that the defect in the software caused the accident.
They would be required to show under section 3 (1) CPA 198 that, 'there is a defect in a product'
this is determined if, 'the safety of the product is not such as persons generally are entitled to
expect'. [39] The 'legitimate expectations' test is therefore used to determine this, and according to
section 3 (2) CPA 1987, the following are taken into account:
'a) the manner in which, and purposes for which, the product has been marketed, its get-up, the
use of any mark in relation to the product and any instructions for, or warnings with respect to,
doing  or  refraining  from  doing  anything  with  or  in  relation  to  the  product;(b)  what  might
reasonably be expected to be done with or in relation to the product; and (c) the time when the
product was supplied by its producer to another' 
This test seems to link well with the standard of safety expected of CAVs, which will be discussed
below. Bryant Walker Smith notes that an autonomous vehicle would have behaved unreasonably
if either, '(a) a human driver or (b) a comparable automated driving system could have done better
under the same circumstances'. [40] The first of these, he notes, ' seems to fit most naturally with
the consumer expectations test still  used by some jurisdictions to determine defect under strict
product liability '.  [41] It  is clear that consumer expectations is not about absolute safety.  [42]
Moreover as noted in a paper pre- AEVA 2018 in relation to whether a consumer can claim for a
defect,  particularly  in  relation  to  software:  'Proving  that  there  was  a  defect  in  the  software
requires  an  in-depth  technological  understanding  of  the  functioning  and  the  malfunctioning
thereof. It is not likely that most victims have easy access to this kind of knowledge. Proving defects
will thus be problematic'. [43] It is submitted that as insurers are likely to have a closer relationship
with manufacturers and a significant awareness of the workings of the technology, there will be
less of a challenge in determining software defects.  [44] Nevertheless, the LC commented upon
the 'insurers' desire for greater certainty,  so that they can price insurance and avoid lengthy or
costly litigation'. [45] 
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2.1 Use of Foresight in the AEVA 2018 
The  AEVA 2018 uses foresight in its approach, predicting challenges which will be faced by CAVs
with  levels  4  and  5  automation,  something  which  is  not  available  publicly  as  of  yet.  The  UK
government has promised that fully autonomous CAVs will be on the road by 2021. [46] The AEVA
2018 is  seen  as  a  framework  which  can  be  developed  and  moulded,  depending  on  the
technologies'  development.  The DfT recognise this through its suggested rolling programme of
regulatory reviews, which, 'will help to facilitate the introduction of innovative new technologies in
a safe, agile and evidence-based manner for the benefit of UK consumers and business '. [47] This is
supported by both insurers and manufacturers.  [48] However, regulatory flexibility through the
introduction  of  a  framework  has  a  potential  significant  downside  in  providing  law  which  is
uncertain, imprecise, unclear, and consequently less user friendly. This, it is submitted, particularly
for  an  area  of  law  which  is  targeted  towards  victim  protection,  could  make  it  difficult  for
consumers and victims to know where they stand in some instances.  The predecessor of  CAV
insurance, compulsory third party motor insurance has a difficult past, where the absence of clarity
for third party victims was heavily criticised. [49] 
2.2 Proactive Law 
Due to the approach noted above, it is evident that the legislature is attempting to be proactive.
This is a counter to what many see as the law being too slow to react when legislative challenges
occur,  and  not  just  in  technology.  [50] Over  the  previous  two  decades,  Scandinavian  and  US
academics, followed later by the European Economic and Social Committee, [51] have been calling
for  legislatures  to  ensure  greater  proactivity  towards  regulatory challenges.  The  proactive  law
theory  was introduced by  Finnish  academic  Helena Haapio,  who argued that  business  people
needed 'vaccinating' against the 'disease' of legal uncertainty.  [52] Haapio's approach was more
centred on contract law and business, rather than technology law. This was later applied to a wider
range of considerations through the European Council, who stated:
"For too long, the emphasis in the legal field has been on the past. Legislators and the judiciary
have  responded  to  deficits,  disputes,  missed  deadlines  and  breaches,  seeking  to  resolve  and
remedy. Disputes, proceedings, and remedies to force compliance cost too much. That cost cannot
be measured in terms of money alone" [53] 
As noted above, regulating too late and attempting to remedy when legal challenges arise is one of
the key criticisms with law, this is something that proactive law seeks to address by anticipating
future challenges. Of course, the focus on certainty within proactive law therefore means that the
theory goes much further than this statement, to include not just 'careful planning' but also, 'the
active  and  effective  participation...of  stakeholders  before  and  during  the  drafting  of  any
proposals...with continuous dialogue' . [54] This is arguably met by the AEVA 2018, with the CCAV
constantly  in  dialogue  with  a  number  of  stakeholders  from  mobility,  legal  practitioners,  the
insurance industry, and manufacturers. [55] Although as will be shown below, the Law Commission
released their Preliminary Consultation Paper [56] with certain issues arising from the AEVA 2018
just a few months after it passed Royal Assent, and have further published responses to that Paper.
[57] Furthermore and possibly most importantly, proactive law is based on certainty, not just for
the courts and legislature,  but also for  stakeholders,  as  noted by Berger Walliser,  with,  'other
actors  in  society  need to  have at least a basic  understanding of  the legal  "mines" '.  [58] It  is
therefore important in an AEVA 2018 context, that victims and consumers need to be aware of at
least the basic extent of the provisions and challenges faced by the introduction of  legislative
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provisions, and further that legal practitioners, insurers and manufacturers need to be aware, to a
much  greater  extent,  of  their  rights  and  responsibilities.  The  absence  of  certainty  can  be
detrimental to innovation and the uptake of technology. CAVs are undoubtedly already in a very
uncertain market, and as noted by Blind et al , 'Firms operating in a market with high uncertainty
may be confronted by a highly heterogeneous technical landscape and the unpredictable consumer
behaviour'. [59] 
In a non-technological, historical context, a pertinent example of how the absence of proactivity
can have a negative impact can be found in the history of conventional motor insurance law. Motor
vehicles  were  introduced  on  UK  roads  in  1895,  [60] it  was  not  until  35  years  later  that  the
legislature addressed insurance challenges arising from their introduction. [61] The legislation, [62]
when  introduced,  was  also  poorly  thought  through  and  continued  to  leave  victims  without
compensation due to significant loopholes for insurers to use. [63] For example, section 38 of the
Road Traffic Act 1930 only exempted certain policy terms in the drivers' policy from being used by
the insurer against the third party victim, [64] meaning that the insurer was able to utilise policy
terms against the third party and deprive them of compensation. Section 12 of the Road Traffic Act
1934 reduced the use of policy terms further [65] although did not completely abolish them. The
significant problem then, was that unlike in the current situation, there was no compensation fund
in relation to accidents caused by uninsured or untraced drivers, therefore, where a policy term
was  used,  third  party  victims  were  left  without  any  form  of  redress.  Victims  often  found
themselves in positions where they did not know whether they could claim, or were excluded due
to the unclear and imprecise nature of  the legislation.  [66] Once the legislature attempted to
remedy  the  loopholes,  the  absence  of  further  proactivity  left  the  law  behind,  with  gaps  in
protection  for  victims  of  uninsured  or  untraced  drivers.  It  took  16  years  for  the  MIB  to  be
introduced, where third parties were mostly compensated. Conventional  vehicle insurance was
therefore reactive to challenges, causing injustice.
The proactive law theory, however, has not developed significantly in relation to technology and
artificial  intelligence. Nevertheless,  it  is  notable that both academics and practitioners use the
word 'proactive'  in  pointing towards what the law on artificial  intelligence should be.  [67] For
example, Baker-McKenzie argued in evidence cited by the House of Lords Artificial  Intelligence
Committee,  that  there  must  be  a,  'proactive,  principles-led  intervention,  based  on  a  sound
understanding of the issues and technology, careful consideration and planning'.  [68] It is clear,
overall, that proactive law is about the provision of comprehensible solutions to challenges, rather
than being reactive to problems that  have already occurred.  The ECSC,  for  example,  uses  the
phrase '  anticipation of  solutions  rather  than problems'. [69] However,  whilst  proactive  law is
future based, it does not provide definite timings as to when legislation should be introduced in
relation to the technology. It is therefore important to explore this.
3. Regulatory Disconnection and the 'when question' 
3.1 The 'when question' 
The  so  called  'when question' is  a  significant  issue  in  terms  of  technology  law.  The  so  called
Collingridge dilemma, introduced by David Collingridge in 1980 provides, [70] as noted by Butenko:
' On  the  one  hand,  in  the  early  stages  of  technological  development,  there  is  insufficient
information regarding potential harms and benefits, but on the other hand, in later stages it can be
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very difficult, if not impossible, to alter the status quo once the technology has matured, diffusion
has taken place and it has become an innovation ' [71] 
Moreover,regulating too early, whilst seen as positive, has significant potential to cause regulatory
disconnection further down the line once the technology is introduced. As noted in Leenes et al,
'controlling a technology is difficult in its early stages because not enough is known of its possible
or probable effects', [72] the so-called 'uncertainty paradox'. [73] Regulatory disconnection, 'could
arise  when innovation in the market  develops  in a faster  tempo or  differently  than envisaged
compared to respective regulation'. [74] Whilst regulatory disconnection is often seen negatively, it
is not necessarily problematic, although in certain cases it could cause regulatory failure, [75] and
therefore should be eliminated where possible. [76] Moreover, it is not always straightforward to
make changes to legislation quick enough to ensure that connection is maintained, therefore there
is a need for a degree of ingenuity to maintain connection (this will  be discussed later in this
article).  Further, premature regulation of technology which is continuously developing, has the
potential to result in poorly aligned regulations that inappropriately ' lock in' inferior technological
choices.  [77] In  addition,  as  noted  by  Fong,  by  acting  too  precipitously,  market  mechanisms,
technological  solutions, or  other extra-legal  responses that may have had greater effectiveness
may not have an opportunity to develop. [78] Of course, it is difficult to know exactly alternative
solutions that could have been introduced by the market and technologists Manufacturers have
suggested at times that they would be willing to compensate victims of CAVs, even where there
was no legislative regime compelling them to do so comprehensively. [79] However, Butenko and
Larouche note  that,  '  regulation  influences  the  incentives  of  firms  and individuals  to  dedicate
resources to activities, such as research and development or market surveys, which can lead to
socially beneficial innovation' . [80] 
The  failure  to  regulate,  or  for  regulation  to  keep  up  with  technology,  can  be  detrimental  to
innovation due to the inevitable disconnection between the law and technological development
(this will be discussed in more depth below). Regulation could eventually become disconnected,
and real challenges which require legislation, could be without adequate remedy.
3.2 The Acceleration of Technology and Struggle to Keep Up 
In his book  Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution ,  Professor Brownsword notes,
that, 'the pace of technological development, already too fast for the law, is accelerating', [81] with
the inevitable result that 'technology is capable of leaving the law behind'. [82] The law is already
behind in some areas of technology, for example, as noted by Leenes et al, [83] the use of surgical
robots is gaining ground across the world as a method of performing complex surgical tasks. There
is, however, only limited footing in regulation in relation to this, particularly at EU level and in the
US, whereby surgeons are not required to hold any specific qualifications for the use of these
robots, despite being significantly different than traditional surgery. [84] 
Brownsword's statement is very pertinent for the pace of development in terms of CAVs. However,
there is limited evidence of regulatory disconnection in relation to CAVs currently, with regulation
generally managing to maintain pace, due to the UK legislatures' proactive approach. [85] The UK
is  attempting  to  position  itself  to  ensure  that  regulatory  barriers  are  not  in  the  way  of  CAV
development, something that it sees as an area of important growth potential,  [86] particularly
post Brexit.  [87] Nevertheless, much of the UK's regulatory development has been through soft
law and codes. For example, the Code for Testing of CAVs was first introduced in September 2015
[88] and then updated in February 2019.  [89] Additionally,  the UK Government issued the'key
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principles for cyber security for connected and automated vehicles' [90] in August 2017, these are
guidelines aimed at manufacturers in order to keep vehicles secure against cyber threats. The Law
Commission has also been tasked with investigating challenges and solutions to a number of legal
issues,  [91] with final recommendations due at the beginning of 2021.  [92] Whilst regulation is
arguably  therefore  currently  keeping  up  with  CAVs,  this  area  of  technology  is  particularly
vulnerable to regulatory disconnection due to the disruptive nature of the technology. As noted
above,  whilst  regulatory disconnection is  not  in itself  problematic,  where it  leads  to potential
regulatory  failure  this  could  cause  significant  challenges  and should be eliminated  where it  is
possible.
The AEVA 2018 has taken the first step in regulating insurance and some core liability issues before
the technology has actually arisen, therefore attempting to provide some certainty. Whilst the UK
has a head start in preparing for the introduction of fully automated CAVs, this does not remove
the potential  for  regulatory disconnection to occur later.  The legislature undoubtedly needs to
ensure continued proactivity in maintaining regulatory connection and dealing with challenges
that  are  being faced. CAVs are  perhaps even more prone to the negative effect  of  regulatory
disconnection due to the already wary reaction of consumers to these vehicles. For example, a
University of Michigan study into public perception of CAVs found that whilst there was some
positivity attached to the introduction, the respondents were nevertheless wary in terms of cyber
security with further concern in relation to whether these vehicles were safer than human drivers.
[93] Public influence is likely to have a significant say as to how this technology is going to continue
to  develop,  Walker  Smith  notes  that  there  is  potential,  unless  CAVs  are  at  least  safer  than
conventional vehicles, that consumers will not adopt them. [94] 
4. Regulatory Connection and Certainty in the AEVA 2018 
This part of the article focusses on the AEVA 2018 in light of regulatory connection and certainty
(certainty is, as noted above, a focus of proactive law). As noted by Brownsword and Somsen, ' The
more the law strives to be precise and comprehensive, the sooner it is likely to be disconnected
from rapidly changing technologies that are its regulatory targets '. [95] Technology neutral terms
and wider regulatory drafting are likely to have the flexibility to cater for the technology as it
continues to develop, [96] this is the so called 'vertical approach to regulatory disconnection'. [97]
As  noted  by  Butenko  and  Larouche,  'Technological  neutrality  can  be  interpreted  as  a  duty
incumbent upon the legislature or regulatory authority to try to enact laws and regulation that are
sustainable over time, instead of requiring review at frequent intervals'. [98] Wider terms will allow
greater  manoeuverbility  for  the  courts  in  deciding  disputes,  whilst  allowing  manufacturers  to
develop products with some flexibility. Introducing regulation with narrow terms, and therefore
less  manoeuvrability,  could  mean  that  the  law  eventually  became  disconnected  with  the
technology and would therefore be of limited use once the technology and its use develop further,
eventually requiring replacement or causing unjust results. As noted by Brownsword in terms of
'descriptive  disconnection',  'the  problem  is  that  the  covering  descriptions  employed  by  the
regulation no longer correspond to the technology or to the various technology-related practices'.
[99] 
The  difficulty  is,  however,  that  whilst  flexible,  a  broad  regulatory  framework  can  also  cause
uncertainty. Brownsword noted similar when stating that the law could become less 'calculable
and consistent'. [100] In a CAV context, this can cause uncertainty for manufacturers and accident
victims, and is also contrary to one of the core principles of proactive law, whereby laws are easily
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accessible to individuals  [101] and allow achievable results.  [102] There is, therefore a potential
conflict between ensuring that the law is connected adequately to technology and also ensuring
that it meets its target audiences' needs. [103] 
The purpose of the AEVA 2018 is the provision, to an extent, of certainty, however, it also provides
significant flexibility, with a number of undefined core terms within the AEVA 2018, particularly in
relation to the Act's scope, which in itself has potential to cause uncertainty. Also, as noted in
detail  above,  the  AEVA 2018,  whilst  providing  some certainty  for  third  party  victims,  has  not
significantly dealt with issues involving insurer to manufacturer claims which will be left to other
areas of law such as product liability or through the law of negligence. Moreover the AEVA 2018 is
currently one of the subjects of a consultation by the Law Commission (LC), with certain areas
being  consulted  upon,  despite  the  AEVA  2018 passing  Royal  Assent  just  four  months  prior.
Therefore  the  AEVA  2018 is  at  risk  of  'perversity',  a  term  noted  by  Butenko  as  concerning,
'regulatory interventions which achieve the exact opposite of their intended outcomes'.  [104] The
question arises as to whether there is an actual need for the legislature to have such an approach,
particularly at such an early stage, to then only supplement the legislation later on and also require
a  further  in  depth  examination  of  some of  its  elements  by  the  LC.  Of  course,  this  does  not
disregard  the  fact  that  through  continued  proactivity  in  the  future,  connection  could  be
maintained  and  therefore  could  ensure  maintained  regulatory  connection.  Nevertheless,
regulatory disconnection in this context would fall under Brownsword's definition of, 'prescriptive
disconnection' that  'the  regulation  no  longer  correspond  to  the  technology  or  to  the  various
technology-related practices that are intended targets for the regulation'.  [105] It is important to
now examine some of the gaps (in addition to what was discussed previously with regards to
manufacturer and insurer claims) in the current AEVA 2018 to then see how these gaps could be
filled later.
4.1 Definition of Terminology 
There are several terms in the AEVA 2018 which have not been defined, although the author notes
one  particular  term  which  has  the  potential  to  cause  significant  uncertainty,  therefore  going
against proactive law at the expense of third party victims who would not know whether they
could claim. Moreover, there could also be questions surrounding whether the term could actually
become prone to regulatory disconnect. The term 'accident' is not defined anywhere within the
AEVA 2018, despite being utilised in a number of core provisions.  [106] Importantly, the term is
drafted  in  technology  neutral  terms,  which  means  that  it  has  provided  some  scope  for  later
interpretation.  However,  the  absence  of  a  definition  within  the  AEVA  2018,  due  to  recent
judgements relating to the definition of the term in relation to conventional  motor insurance,
means that the interpretation of this term could be significant in a CAV context. The majority in the
Court  of  Appeal  obiter in  Charlton  v  Fisher (Charlton),  [107] held  that  accident  should  be
interpreted  to  include  'deliberately  caused  damage' ,  particularly  in  relation  to  third  party
insurance.  [108] Without such an interpretation, there would be no recovery available for third
party victims who are injured as result of purposeful damage from conventional vehicles. Whether
the term will be interpreted likewise for CAVs will be dependent on whether future courts follow
the obiter in Charlton. A wider interpretation of the term accident in a CAV context would increase
the potential for coverage where the vehicle has been hacked, substantially widening the potential
liability for insurers and manufacturers. This may be unsatisfactory for insurers' and manufacturers'
business models due to the potential for valuable claims, although would allow victims to gain
compensation for injuries. [109] This area is therefore prone to 'descriptive disconnection' which as
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noted by Brownsword is where 'new technology raises questions of principle or policy that are not
clearly settled by the regulatory scheme'. [110] A potential solution to this will be discussed later in
this article.
One of the areas whereby the  AEVA 2018 has not, as of yet, provided clarification, is around a
comprehensive definition of an 'automated vehicle' . Of course as noted above, highly automated
vehicles are not currently available publicly and therefore the definition is likely to be clarified
later.  [111] Nevertheless,  the  current  definition  leaves  a  significant  number  of  potential
interpretive difficulties. Section 1 (1) of the AEVA 2018 states:
"The Secretary of State must prepare, and keep up to date, a list of all motor vehicles that— 
(a) are in the Secretary of State's opinion designed or adapted to be capable, in at least some
circumstances or situations, of safely driving themselves, and 
(b) may lawfully be used when driving themselves, in at least some circumstances or situations, on
roads or other public places in Great Britain." 
The  AEVA 2018 is notable in its omission of the SAE  [112] levels in referring to the definition of
automated  vehicles.  Instead,  it  utilises  the  term  'capable  of...safely  driving  themselves'. The
rationale behind the non-utilisation of SAE levels is that whilst the categorisation of vehicles is
potentially helpful in explaining the differences between vehicles of higher and lower automation,
vehicles are unlikely to fall precisely within a particular level. Due to the introduction of the term
'capable',  the  AEVA  2018 provision  clearly  does  not  eliminate  CAVs  which  do  not  have  the
capability all of the time. For example, a CAV could safely drive itself on a motorway, but not on
more complex country roads. [113] Nevertheless, the non-encompassing of vehicles which are of
lower automation, i.e. where the vehicle is able to drive itself but will be required to be monitored
is difficult. It is clear that the rationale behind this is to distinguish automated vehicle technology
(AVT) and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS), the former does not require the user to be
'in the loop' whereas the later does require this.  [114] The CCAV noted that the Association of
British Insurers' and Thatcham Research, along with 'a large number of other insurers and law
firms' wanted to, 'ensure that motorists are clear about what their responsibilities are when using
this technology, and that they must retain full attention when using any driver assistance systems,
however  advanced'.  [115] This  is  of  clear  concern for  the insurance industry,  [116] and policy
makers. [117] The terminology is, at least partly, clarified by section 8 AEVA 2018 which states that
a vehicle is driving itself, if it is not being' monitored' or 'controlled' by an individual. This, however,
does not completely clarify the issue, as neither of these terms are subject to a definition, nor are
they qualified in any way, such as whether this can be 'remote' control or monitoring. This issue, it
is submitted, is particularly prone to regulatory disconnection.
Most significantly, the term 'safely' is again not defined within this section and has the potential for
significant confusion. It is possible here that this could be left open to normative disconnection.
[118] The  term  undoubtedly  causes  challenges  as  to  the  standard  of  safety  expected  and,
'regulators have yet to agree on an acceptable level  of safety or define legitimate methods of
determining the safety of AVs'. [119] A proposal was made in the House of Lords' which would have
provided some clarification, noting that safety would be equivalent to it being 'capable of driving
itself in a manner unlikely to cause damage' as well as being 'protected from cyber risks' .  [120]
Such a proposal, it is submitted, would, at least to some extent, clarify such a term. However, there
would be number of issues remaining, for example, the use of the term 'unlikely' is unfortunate
and does not, it is submitted, determine a particularly high standard of safety. Moreover, it does
not take into account that even the CAV may not be able to prevent more accidents to meet the
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unlikely test, but may make them less severe.  [121] Consequently, this shows that a rush to act
proactively with the aim of providing certainty, without necessarily considering some of the wider
consequences,  does  not  necessarily  connote  good  legislation.  Proactive  law  is  not  about  the
provision of certainty alone, it is also around ensuring that there is adequate consultation. It is,
however, positive that such a rushed recommendation was not taken forward in the AEVA 2018.
In terms of safety, Maurice Schellekens notes that 'the public at large is entitled to expect the
automated car to be as safe as a human driven car'. [122] Schellekens notes that this a 'minimum
standard' as not meeting this would not be acceptable to the European public. [123] Similarly, as
was already noted above in relation to public perception, Bryant Walker-Smith stated that, 'After
all, a consumer is likely to expect that her automated driving system will perform at least as well as
she  would' [124] in  any  given  situation.  In  determining  safety  above  this  level  there  are  two
potential formulations, either that,  'the automated car should statistically be safer than human
drivers', [125] or that it should be 'safer than the best human driver'. [126] The later standard does
not necessarily mean that no accidents happen but rather that 'best human driver could not have
avoided it either'.  [127] The answer as to which, if either, of these approaches will be adopted is
unfortunately unclear within the AEVA 2018 , and much of this will, it is submitted, be a balance
for the legislature. The difficulty is that if the legislature in the UK adopt a too high standard then it
will mean less CAVs coming to market, as manufacturers have to ensure that their vehicles meet
the required threshold, this could mean a delay in technology, which whilst it is safer than current
human drivers, would not be deemed safe enough.  [128] The LC noted that,  'There is no simple
definition of when a vehicle can be said to drive itself safely. Instead, decisions will be made on a
case by- case basis'.  [129] Such a 'case by case' basis, it is submitted, would go against proactive
law,  unless  clear  criteria  is  used.  There  are  some options  in  terms  of  the  adoption  of  safety
standards  already  in  UK  law,  although  these  are  general  standards  in  terms  of  products.  For
example,  there  is  a  definition under  section 19 (1)  (c)  CPA 1987 which states  that,  '"safe",  in
relation to any goods, means such that there is no risk, or no risk apart from one reduced to a
minimum, that any of the following will  (whether  immediately  or after a definite or indefinite
period) cause the death of, or any personal injury to, any person whatsoever'. This is a rather vague
definition, particularly as 'reduced to a minimum' here is not defined nor explained.
Alternatively,  regulation 2  of  the  General  Product  Safety  Regulations  2005 could be a starting
point, it noting that only 'minimum risks' are acceptable. The Regulation further expands on safety
with the following list of factors which are relevant:
"(a)  the  characteristics  of  the  product,  including  its  composition  and...where  applicable,
instructions for installation and maintenance, 
(b) the effect of the product on other products, where it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be
used with other products, 
(c) the presentation of the product, the labelling, any warnings and instructions for its use and
disposal and any other indication or information regarding the product, and 
(d)  the categories of  consumers at risk  when using the product,  in particular children and the
elderly" 
With the potential for both serious personal injury and severe property damage for those who are
particularly at risk in relation to the use of CAVs, the application of these factors would mean a
high standard of safety is required. This, however, does not answer issues in terms of higher levels
of safety, and whether the vehicle would need to be of a standard equating to current driving
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standards, standards of perfection, or somewhere in between. Adding greater complexity is that
the fulfilment of CAV criteria within the AEVA 2018 is based on the Secretary of State's opinion,
and without any guidelines within the  AEVA 2018 as to how the Secretary of State will come to
that opinion. For example, will the Secretary of State introduce certain criteria which will need to
be met for the CAV to be deemed at the level of safety as discussed above? Importantly Bryant
Walker Smith notes a particular issue with determining safety:
'Just because an automated system should be safer than humans does not necessarily mean that it
will  be  safer;  surprises  abound on  roads  as  well  as  in  software.  No company  has  logged the
hundreds of millions of miles that might provide a statistical comparison of actual crash and injury
rates' [130] 
This is an important point, data is currently not available to determine the safety rates in every
single situation, and there may be further issues which may need to be explored before a vehicle is
deemed safe. For example, in relation to cyber security, Walker Smith notes 'systemic risks—of
which cyberattacks are the most prominent—could affect this overall safety performance if they
are realized on a massive scale' . [131] Moreover, there is nothing within the AEVA 2018 to say that
the Secretary of State must publish the rationale or criteria around their decision. Members of the
House of Commons Automated and Electric Vehicles Bill Committee suggested reform to ensure
that  the  Secretary  of  State  must  consult  on,  and  publish  the  criteria,  that  they  will  use  to
determine whether a vehicle is capable of safely driving itself, [132] and that the Secretary of State
could not  change the criteria without consulting interested parties such as manufacturers and
insurers.  [133] The term 'in some circumstances or situations' used in section 2 (1)  AEVA 2018
further widens the definition, and it is submitted makes it less likely for regulatory disconnection to
occur, as even if vehicles are not developed to become significantly automated, which is currently
envisaged, the AEVA 2018 would continue to apply to them as long as they fulfil this.
Interestingly, the approach taken by many states in the US is varied, with some more complex
definitions than others. The Washington D.C. Autonomous Vehicles Act 2012 (Washington DC Act)
defines an 'Automated Vehicle' as capable of' navigating district roadways and interpreting traffic-
control devices without a driver actively operating any of the vehicles control systems' . [134] This
Act is for vehicles not of levels 4 or 5 as it requires a, 'driver seated in the control seat of the
vehicle...who shall be prepared to take control of the autonomous vehicle'. [135] This means that
the difficulty of determining safety is not so significant, as the vehicles will have backup if it fails.
Nevertheless,  it  shows  a  slightly  more  focussed  definition  than  the  AEVA  2018. Whilst  the
Washington DC Act does not link the definition of automated vehicle to SAE levels, the Connecticut
Act links itself to SAE levels 4 and 5, although providing much less detail. The Connecticut Act goes
further in separately defining an 'Automated Driving System', as, 'hardware and software that are
collectively capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis, regardless
of whether the automated driving system is limited to a specific operational design domain '. [136]
With regards to the issue of safety, the Connecticut Act states that the operator or autonomous
vehicle tester will:
'comply  with  standards  established  by  the  National  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration
regarding fully autonomous vehicles; and (C) satisfy any other requirement as determined by the
secretary,  in  consultation  with  the  Commissioners  of  Motor  Vehicles,  Transportation  and
Emergency Services and Public Protection, as necessary to ensure the safe operation of such fully
autonomous vehicle'. [137] 
The NHTSA has already introduced 'voluntary guidance' in relation to the safety of  automated
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driving systems, [138] this guidance does not lay down specific performance criteria and data, but
rather broader considerations and principles. Whilst such safety principles are deemed voluntary,
the enshrining of these in legislation would mean that they are legally binding and principles to
follow. Interestingly, and as noted previously in this article, the UK already has principles in terms
of  cyber  security  [139] as  well  as  testing  of  autonomous vehicles,  [140] these are  not  legally
binding  although  are  material  for  the  court  to  decide  in  determining  liability.  Following  the
Connecticut approach would require the UK to introduce further guidance in relation to the safety
of CAVs or use an external framework which would then be enacted upon to make compulsory.
Moreover, it is submitted that the legislative element of the Connecticut Act would be prone to
regulatory disconnection as the terms used are not technology neutral. However, the use of soft
law, as will be shown later, could be beneficial for the UK in determining safety.
It is notable, however, that the US system relating to the regulation of CAVs is fragmented rather
than federalised. This is similar to the regulatory regime in Australia which, again is fragmented.
[141] Bryant Walker Smith, noted the challenge this brings in the US when defining even the most
basic  of  terms.  For  example  'driver'  in  a  CAV  context  has  a  number  of  different  potential
definitions,  [142] this is similar for 'operator', again providing definitions of different ranges and
detail.  [143] This  consequently  provides  the  potential  for  States  to  have  varying  degrees  of
certainty, and potential future regulatory disconnection. It further provides significant potential for
intra-US competition between states, competing to attract CAV technology and manufacturers to
their roads. [144] 
The priority in most US states is to provide the necessary certainty in defining CAVs today, without
significant concern for regulatory connection later. The difficulty is that such certainty is at least
partially negated through the fact that each US state has different definitions, which therefore
potentially  undermines  certainty  for  those  travelling  across  border.  Similar  challenges  for
definitions could occur within the UK and the European Union. As well as the land border between
the UK and Ireland, vehicles are able to travel  to the EU mainland. The UK, through its broad
definition of CAVs, has the added benefit of having a greater chance of regulatory alignment with
the EU later, due to the potential manoeuvrability within the definition and its wider coverage.
[145] Interestingly, in the US, academics such as Diehl and Thue argue for a more precise definition
of CAVs in the US, in order to prevent,  'unintentional restrictions on existing, semi-autonomous
technology'.  [146] This  was  particularly  in  relation  to  the  Nevada  definition  of  an  automated
vehicle involving, 'a motor vehicle that uses artificial intelligence, sensors, and global positioning
system coordinates to drive itself without the active intervention of a human operator'.  [147] The
Nevada regulation was later amended due to the unintentional inclusion of vehicles which have
park  assist  and  cruise  control  within  the  definition.  This  could  be  similar  for  the  AEVA 2018
definition of automated vehicle which seemingly does not restrict self-parking vehicles, although it
is  difficult  to know whether this  is  intentional.  The definition therefore,  does not  provide the
necessary clarity as of yet and is rather wide, inevitably with the foresight that it will be clarified in
the future when the technology is further developed. Such a definition, it is submitted, does not
completely  comply  with  proactive  law  and  is  not  connected  with  the  technology,  although  a
continued proactive approach could ensure that the technology and legislation is connected.
4.2 Certainty Challenges Found by the Law Commission 
The  LC  announced  a  wide  terms  of  reference  to  examine,  inter  alia ,  liability  and  insurance
challenges related to CAVs.  The LC noted,  however,  that  its  aim was not to reopen significant
discussion on the premise behind the AEVA 2018 , but rather, to examine some of the detail within.
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[148] This is an interesting approach and one which, it is submitted, is confounding in terms of
legislative process. The LC's role is around 'reform' [149] and often provides reform to areas where
there is a historic need for change, [150] with the result often that the LC recommendations are
picked up and legislated upon at a later date. However in relation to CAVs and the AEVA 2018, it is
evident that this is the other way around, i.e. the legislation being introduced first, with the LC
examining required amendment. This seems particularly unconventional and leaves the impression
that the legislation was rushed through without consideration or legislative scrutiny.
In relation to contributory negligence, section 3 (1) of the AEVA 2018 provides the insurer with the
right of recovery against the injured party where, 'b) the accident, or the damage resulting from it,
was to any extent caused by the injured party'. Moreover section 6 (3) of the AEVA 2018 notes, '
For the purposes of section 3(1), the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945...have effect
as if  the behaviour of the automated vehicle were the fault of the person made liable for the
damage by section 2 of this Act'.  The LC noted issues surrounding the interaction between the
AEVA 2018 provisions as noted above, alongside the AEVA 2018 's strict liability approach, and the
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The LC is concerned that the requirement for the
court to 'imagine' [151] that the accident was the fault of the vehicle user rather than the vehicle
itself,  essentially  moving  away  from  fact  based  decision  making  to  looking  at  hypothetical
scenarios. The LC noted that 'The concern is that section 3(1) could be used to apply standards of
human fault to quite different claims involving automated vehicles'.  [152] This is a fair point to
make by the LC as the technology and human decision making are quite different things. A link
here can be made to previous discussion in this article around the definition of safety, with the
questions surrounding the comparator between the standards of safety in a CAV compared to the
standards  of  conventional  vehicles,  and  to  what  extent  they  should  match.  The  LC  wanted
recommendations as to whether contributory negligence in the  AEVA 2018 should be clarified.
[153] As noted by the LC, responses to this question in the Consultation 'were split', [154] however,
the LC noted that, 'there was no pressing need for reform'. [155] It was noted by ABI and Thatcham
that, 'While the wording may not be ideal, the intent is reasonably clear and the view across the
motor insurance market is that the provisions will work in practice'. [156] It seems therefore that
despite reform being unlikely at the current time, it would not be surprising if this was revisited
later. Such an issue, as will be noted below, is not comparatively hugely significant for accident
victims, as the number of claims with which this effects is likely to be minimal, compared to issues
involving the definition of automated vehicles which goes to the very heart of the legislation.
The second issue noted by the LC was causation and whether this should be left to the courts to
determine. Causation is contained within the AEVA 2018 with the requirement that the accident is
'caused by'  the  automated vehicle  (section  2  (1)).  Moreover,  section  8  (3)  notes  'an accident
includes a reference to two or more causally  related accidents;  (b)  a reference to an accident
caused by an automated vehicle includes a reference to an accident that is partly caused by an
automated  vehicle'.  Causation  usually  relates  to  factual  causation  which  is  interpreted  by  the
courts, and is something that is used in conventional motor insurance in the RTA 1988 through the
terminology  'caused by or arising out of use of'. [157] However the  AEVA 2018 is  much more
limiting that RTA 1988 as it does not use the term 'arising out of the use of' and instead notes that
the accident must be ' caused by 'a vehicle 'whilst driving itself'. [158] The use of 'caused by' in the
AEVA  2018 connotes  traditional  causation  principles,  i.e.  the  'but  for' [159] test,  along  with
whether there was an intervening act. [160] The LC noted that 'the courts have long experience of
dealing with causation issues to provide fair, common-sense outcomes' , [161] this, however is not
always evident, and the courts have sometimes found difficulty in their approach to causation
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issues, particularly in areas where policy meets principle, leading to what some call  'the chaos
theory'.  [162] The  provision  of  a  case  by  case  basis  in  this  area  is  one  which  could  lead  to
significant uncertainty, particularly as there are issues, as noted by the LC, concerning causation
and the interaction of  a  strict  liability system within the  AEVA 2018.  The LC note a particular
scenario [163] whereby an automated vehicle is shunted by a vehicle from behind into a vehicle in
front, whilst the automated vehicle may not be deemed 'at fault' for the accident, its presence
alone and the fact that collides into another vehicle could mean that causation is met, meaning
that the insurer would have to compensate under section 2 (1) of the  AEVA 2018 and recover
against the driver's insurer of the vehicle behind, although this is not completely clear cut.  [164]
Whilst such an issue may be relatively simple for the courts to solve, the greater difficulty could lie
involving scenarios which are not currently predictable and would require the courts to go further
than interpreting the statute, by actively filling the gaps. The responses to the LC were, it seems,
varied, with some proponents of a case based system, and others who favoured some further
clarification.  [165] This  is  undoubtedly  challenging,  as  it  would  be  difficult  to  determine  all
scenarios in terms of causation, however, there will also be significant uncertainty if the courts are
required to deal with all causation issues.  [166] The LC noted, however, that causation 'is not a
priority  at  present'.  [167] The  LC  are  in  the  challenging  situation  of  examining  solutions  to  a
challenge  of  which  the  full  extent  of  is  not  yet  known,  with  the  need  for  greater  certainty,
particularly for the insurance industry.  [168] This could be an area which is prone to regulatory
disconnection as the legislation may not be compatible with some of the causation challenges. Of
course, the difficulty here in maintaining connection is around the absence of knowledge relating
to some of the challenges.
However,  the  LC  could  provide  solutions  which  whilst  providing  clarification,  could  prove
burdensome for  the insurance industry,  albeit  in  the context  of  the  purpose  shown from the
legislature in the introduction of the AEVA 2018, through the creation of a strict liability system.
For example, the LC noted a situation where a collision between the automated vehicle and the
victim is caused by a third party (i.e. a cyclist with which the vehicle tries to get around). [169] Here
the vehicle is not at fault yet the insurer will be deemed completely liable and unable to recover
from the manufacturer. Such an instance would mean that insurers are having to burden the cost
of something outside of their control.
4.3 Conflicts between Innovation and the Heightened Regulatory Burden 
After discussion of the above challenges relating to the  AEVA 2018, it is notable that there is a
conflict  in  providing  the additional  certainty  through the provision of  a  heightened regulatory
burden (HRB), whilst ensuring that innovation is not harmed. Of course, law makers are also 'under
pressure' to apply the '  precautionary principle as a means for developing preventive measures
against new potential threats'.  [170] However, as noted by the European Council, 'regulation can
simultaneously constrain and drive innovation, whilst a lack of regulation may lead to uncertainty' .
[171] 
One  can  link  the  previous  discussion  in  relation  to  safety,  if  the  AEVA 2018 provides  a  strict
definition of safety, then innovation could suffer. As noted above in this chapter, if the definition of
safety provides too much of a regulatory burden then manufacturers would need to delay the
introduction of  technology  to ensure that  its  technology meets  that  threshold.  Whilst  this,  as
noted above could make the technology safer, it may delay the introduction of technology which is
nevertheless safer  than conventional  vehicles.  [172] Of  course,  significant  regulation can drive
innovation through the certainty it provides to manufacturers as to how the technology will be
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regulated, and certainty as to the barriers that will be faced, essentially allowing manufacturers to
plan  the  cost  of  regulation.  However,  as  noted by  Blind  et  al  in  relation  to  'highly  uncertain
markets',  'In such markets ,information asymmetries that increase the probability of a potential
misfit between regulations or formal standards and the underlying market technologies increase
drastically'.  [173] Moreover, 'This effect is more distinct in r elation to regulations as they stem
from a top-down legislative process' .  [174] Consequently, 'as  a result, regulation has a negative
impact on a firm's innovation efficiency in highly uncertain markets'. [175] 
Manwaring in citing Kirby notes that excessive regulation may be an option worse than doing
nothing at all, 'particularly where investment in beneficial new technologies may be unnecessarily
fettered or driven offshore by regulatory interference and compliance costs'. [176] Innovation can
be challenged significantly by the provision of a HRB in relation to any absence of flexibility on
innovators as to how to comply with such burden. [177] This needs to be taken into account when
regulating. However, the need to ensure innovation and the push for a lower regulatory burden
through a flexible framework has the potential to provide uncertainty, something that is arguably
against the proactive law theory which was discussed above in this article. It is clear from this
discussion, that any approach taken should be aware of the burden that it places on manufacturers
as well as the impact on society as a whole.
5. Solutions to Ensure a Balance between Regulatory Connection
and Proactive Law 
As shown above, the  AEVA 2018 has some challenges in terms of interpretation, particularly in
relation to the definition of an automated vehicle which will need to eventually be solved. This is
an area whereby the law will need to keep up with technological development, and it is this which
is the primary focus of this part of the article. As noted by Brownsword, 'Even (or especially) when
regulatory  frameworks  have  been  put  in  place,  they  enjoy  no  immunity  against  technological
change', [178] Moreover there is 'no guarantee' that the system introduced will be effective. [179]
There are two particular strategies which could be used in this instance, the first being soft law and
the second being purposive interpretation.
5.1 Soft Law 
Soft law could provide an appropriate solution to some of the definition challenges noted above,
particularly in relation to the absence of clarity in the definition of an automated vehicle within the
AEVA  2018.  As  noted  above,  the  AEVA  2018 has  not  provided  an  adequate  definition  of  an
automated vehicle  nor  has  it  provided any  measure  of  the safety  expected.  Soft  law may be
beneficial in defining an automated vehicle as it is seen as a lighter and flexible measure of law,
[180] something that this author submits, could be beneficial in terms of regulatory burden. The
definition of soft law is  'contested' .  [181] However, as noted by Abbot et al, 'Soft law lacks the
mandatory, enforceable character of hard law'.  [182] It  can take a variety of forms, potentially
encompassing; resolutions, guidelines, recommendations, communications or notices.  [183] Soft
law is used in a number of areas of law which are not related to technology, for example in relation
to investment arbitration, [184] as well as corporate governance. [185] In relation to the definition
of  CAVs,  soft  law  guidelines  could  beaccessible  to  stakeholders  and  the  public  through  the
provision of criteria for the Secretary of State to follow when defining a CAV, therefore providing
some certainty to manufacturers, users and insurers of CAVs whilst providing the above flexibility.
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Further as noted by Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Skees and Adam Thierer, 'regulators might find soft
law preferable to hard law when they have limited time, resources, and knowledge to deal with
fast-moving technologies and rapidly-evolving sectors'.  [186] However the same authors further
recognise some of the limitations of the 'soft law' approach. For example, in relation to trust, they
note, 'a certain level of trust must exist between the regulatory body, the innovator, and the public.
They must all believe that actions and agreements will be undertaken in reasonably good faith and
that all interests will be appropriately balanced and considered'. [187] 
The SAE levels are an example of guidelines which could be used as soft law in the future for
determining the definition of an automated vehicle, [188] although this would depend on their use
as guidelines and not being entrenched in statute. As noted above, some US states refer to these
levels consistently through their definitions of automated vehicle and automated driving systems,
therefore  giving  the  levels  legally  binding  effect.  However,  the  insertion  of  these  levels  into
legislation reduce potential flexibility due to the conversion from soft law recommendations, to
hard  law  enshrined  in  legislation  therefore  essentially  removing  the  beneficial  flexibility
surrounding them. The UK has chosen not to refer to the SAE levels in the AEVA 2018, due to the
complexity involved. As noted previously, the UK's current definition of CAV, compared to some US
state definitions, would not fit neatly within the SAE Levels, due to the term ' in some situations' in
the UK's definition. Of course, similar guidelines or recommendations in soft law could be drawn
up by the UK in defining a CAV. This could be used as a complementary function to AEVA 2018 such
as through an 'informal guidance document', a tool which is often issued by an agency to clarify its
interpretation of a statute or regulation. [189] 
There are a number of potential options in terms of the introduction of soft law, some of these
have  already  been  introduced  and  are  already  used  for  CAVs  but  in  a  different  context.
Alternatively, stakeholders have introduced criteria for what they see as an automated vehicle. For
example, the Association of British Insurers developed principles for automated vehicles with both
features  and  performance  data  included.  [190] These  are  broader  principles  such  as  that  the
technology must be 'law abiding' and that it should be able to come to an' appropriate safe stop' .
[191] Whilst this is more detailed that what is currently used in the AEVA 2018 , the principles are
still quite broad. For example, one of the criteria is ' Safe driving' that the 'vehicle can manage all
reasonably  expected  situations  by  itself'. [192] This  does  not  overcome  the  issue  as  to  the
determination as to how 'safety' is to be determined, with further issues around how 'expected
situations' are determined. [193] Moreover, soft law is currently used in the UK in relation to the
testing of CAVs and the Principles for Cyber Security of Autonomous Vehicles. Comparatively, the
Testing Code [194] provides a slightly more expansive definition of a CAV. It distinguishes between
and provides a definition for conditionally,  highly and fully and highly automated vehicles. The
Code notes that a fully automated vehicle is:
'A vehicle fitted with an ADS that does not require a safety driver as a fall-back. The vehicle is
capable of safely completing any journey without the need for a driver in all  traffic,  road and
weather conditions that could be managed by a competent human driver'. [195] 
A highly automated vehicle is further defined as:
'A vehicle fitted with an ADS that does not require a safety driver as a fall-back. The driver does not
need to respond to a system takeover demand. The ADS can be activated within specific driving
situations such as motorway driving or in low speed conditions'. [196] 
Finally, a conditionally automated vehicle is defined as:
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'A vehicle fitted with an ADS that requires a safety driver to act as a fall-back for the system to
assure safety while the vehicle is in automated mode. The safety driver must respond to a system
takeover demand'. [197] 
These definitions both overlap and extend further than the definition contained in the AEVA 2018 .
The fully automated vehicle definition, however, goes further by the use of 'any' as to where the
vehicle is capable of safely driving.  [198] The definition of higher automated vehicle would also
likely  fall  within  the  AEVA  2018  although  the  requirement  of  a  safety  driver  in  conditionally
automated vehicle would mean it does not fall within. Interestingly these terms utilise the word
'safety', which, similar to the AEVA 2018, has not been defined within the code and would need
further expansion. Further, both fully and highly automated vehicles were defined in the previous
testing Code and in the fully automated vehicle definition, the vehicle would be'  designed to be
capable of safely completing journeys without the need for a driver in all traffic, road and weather
conditions' which 'can be managed by a competent human driver' . [199] The requirement that the
journey would need to be 'managed by a competent human driver' is interesting, and one which
seems to follow the safety being closer to vehicles of the current standard, rather than of a greater
standard, this has been removed in the later definition.
Nevertheless, the split between the fully and highly automated vehicles is not necessarily workable
for the  AEVA 2018, whereas the Code for Testing provides different requirements depending on
the automation level of the vehicle, the AEVA 2018 is one set of insurance rules applicable to the
definition given which is not directly applicable to a fully automated vehicle (due to the absence of
the term 'certain'). However, the means of definition through the Code could be particularly useful.
Whilst manufacturers are not legally required to follow the Code as such, failure to follow has the
potential for liability proceedings against the manufacturer. [200] Of course, it is not envisaged that
the AEVA 2018 would follow the definition of CAV in the Code for Testing precisely, the definition
here is still too vague and clearly not calculable.
Alternatively, of course, a harmonised framework of safety could be used as guidance to determine
the interpretation of safety in the AEVA 2018 and could further provide a solution internationally.
Harmonisation could provide significant benefits and remove potential challenges in the future, for
example the difficulty in terms of whether a vehicle in one jurisdiction which is deemed safe, does
not meet the requirements in the UK. [201] A potential solution within this is the use of soft law
[202] to harmonise. As noted by Marchant and Allenby, 'Although not legally binding, soft-law
instruments  do  have  some  beneficial  features.  Because  they  are  not  promulgated  by  any
government,  their  application is  not limited to that government's jurisdiction,  but is  inherently
international  in  scope'.  [203] There  are  already  standards  as  produced  by  the  International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) named ISO's and are applicable to the safety of CAVs. For
example ISO's falling under ISO/TC 204 on 'Intelligent transport systems'. [204] The introduction of
ISO's to assist the interpretation of safety is therefore a potential solution, however, this would
require an ISO being introduced directly on the relevant safety requirements of CAVs and which
would fit within the UK framework. However, the Secretary of State would still  be required to
interpret  and  apply  these  standards  in  making  the  decision  and  to  draw  their  up  their  list.
Alternatively, the United Nations Economic Council for Europe Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety
has developed the, 'Resolution on the deployment of highly and fully automated vehicles in road
traffic' [205] which provides a number of recommendations such as that the vehicle should, 'React
to unforeseen situations in a way that minimizes danger to the vehicle's users and other road
users...(and) Communicate with their users and other road users, in a clear, effective and consistent
way,  by  providing  sufficient  information  about  their  status  and  intention,  and  enabling  an
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 10, Issue 2, 2019 
appropriate  interaction'. [206] It  seems  that  the  legislature  is  in  favour  of  adopting  UNECE
recommendations in determining the safety of a vehicle, as this could also fall within harmonised
soft  law.  [207] Such  an  approach  could  be  beneficial  due  to  the  amount  of  discussion  and
consultation internationally which takes place at  the UNECE.  [208] However, such an approach
would need to be compatible with the AEVA 2018 or the AEVA 2018 would need to be altered. The
introduction  of  soft  law  for  CAVs  is  a  potential  way  to  maintain  connection.  First,  and  most
importantly,  soft  law  would  allow  a  certain  amount  of  flexibility  and  manoeuvrability  for  the
Secretary of State in determining the exact definition of an automated vehicle and safety, as long
as it matches the broad definition within the AEVA 2018, therefore permitting decisions based on
the  technological  situation  at  the  time  and  allowing  the  technology  to  stay  connected.  [209]
Second, soft law is much easier to update without the need for amending legislation to go through
Parliament, again allowing it to change easily and quickly based on the development of technology
and  reducing  chances  of  disconnection.  [210] This  would  therefore  potentially  solve  some
challenges,  as noted by Kaal,  that rule makers,  'perpetuate a costly and uncertainty-increasing
process of rule revisions, amendments, and repeals to address...shortcomings'. [211] Of course, it is
important that any soft law is thoroughly discussed with enough scrutiny,to make it as compliant
as possible with proactive law. The absence of scrutiny is a risk particularly in light of what we have
discussed above. It was evident that the legislature had not completely addressed all of the issues
resulting  from the  introduction  of  technology,  meaning  that  the  LC  has  had  to  revisit  certain
elements.  [212] Third, due to its manoeuvrability and flexibility, soft law is unlikely to cause as
much  disruption  to  innovation  as  a  hard  law  legislative  definition.  However,  whilst  soft  law
provides greater certainty, flexibility also limits certainty compared to hard law, particularly if the
soft law guidance is not changed on paper when flexibility is used. This could mean a significant
challenge in terms of compliance with proactive law. However, it is submitted that greater detail
than currently exists for the definition of CAVs would be welcome and increase compliance with
proactive law, as long as this does not lead to perversity. Further, Hagemann, Skees and Thierer
note that there would be less certainty in relation to soft law and further that, 'uncertainty can
limit an inflow of resources into a market, slowing or preventing innovation' . [213] Moreover, the
flexibility with soft law would only be used by the Secretary of State, who would be utilising the
guidelines  to  produce  a  list  of  automated  vehicles,  the  guidelines  would  be  helpful  to
manufacturers but the non-compatibility with them would mean that the Secretary of State could
refuse  to  put  the  vehicle  on  the  list,  this  therefore  removes  a  significant  issue  around  non-
compliance with important safety standards. Nevertheless, as noted by Leenes et al, the voluntary
basis  of  soft  law could  'enhance  the  level  of  acceptability  for  stakeholders'.  [214] Fourth,  the
compatibility of soft law with harmonisation could be a significant benefit, particularly when issues
such as safety could cause cross border challenges.
Soft law could potentially be used in terms of the causation issues noted by the LC. As noted
above, there were differing viewpoints in terms of the best solution in relation to causation, with
slightly more consultation respondents wanting further clarification. [215] Clarification was wanted
by the ABI and Thatcham who noted concerns that causation would cause a 'considerable degree
of uncertainty',  [216] and further that insurers would be 'be less able to price accurately'. [217]
However,  DAC  Beachcroft  noted  that,  'it  would  be  difficult  to  identify  an  'exhaustive  list  of
scenarios'. [218] Case law would mean the courts essentially filling gaps in the law, consequently,
soft  law could be used when future gaps are apparent,  and this  would allow the provision of
greater certainty whilst allowing the necessary flexibility.
It  therefore  seems that  soft  law,  with  some additions  and particularly  when addressing  cross
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border challenges such as safety and defining automated vehicles, could be a positive solution,
albeit  if  it  is  assured  that  manufacturers,  insurers  and other  stakeholders  are  involved  in  the
decision making and that it does not create even greater uncertainty. Of course it is clear that
absolute certainty is a significant challenge. Soft law could be the way to ensure that regulatory
connection is maintained, and would allow relatively quick changes, ensuring continued regulatory
connection. It would further mean compliance with proactive law, at least to a certain extent. Of
course,  it  can  be  questioned  whether  there  is  another  approach  more  conducive  to  certain
challenges faced in the AEVA 2018 , such as 'purposive interpretation'.
5.2 Purposive Interpretation 
A  potential  way  for  the  AEVA  2018 to  maintain  regulatory  connection  is  through  the  courts'
purposive interpretation of the Act depending on technological development at the time. This, it is
submitted, would be unlikely to be used in relation to the definition of automated vehicle in the
AEVA 2018, due to the fact that the decision is to be made by the Secretary of State as to what falls
within the definition. However, it could be beneficial in terms of the definition of accident in a CAV
context along with the issues pointed out by the LC which would be more suitable to a purposive
approach. As noted by Lyra Bennet Moses, 'A judge adopting a purposive approach in dealing with
cases involving new technologies is more likely to reach the result that would have been reached at
the time of  the rule's  creation,  had the future been foreseen'. [219] An example  of  purposive
interpretation in practice can be found in Human Fertilisation and in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of
State for Health ( R v SOSH ). [220] In R v SOSH the definition of 'embryo' in the Human Fertilisation
and  Embryology  Act  1990 (HFEA  1990 )  was  examined  in  relation  to  newer  technological
developments. At the time of the introduction of the  HFEA 1990 , the creation of live embryos
without fertilization was not in existence, and Parliament when introducing the HFEA 1990 would
not have known about this technique. [221] The House of Lords held that the HFEA 1990 definition
covered CNR. Lord Bingham noted that whilst it was a 'constitutional imperative'  [222] that the
courts stick to their interpretative role and do not 'assume the mantle of regulators' [223] the
court can use purposive interpretation.
Although  Parliament  was  not  aware  of  the  scientific  possibility  of  CNR  at  the  time  of  the
introduction of HFEA 1990, the Courts could interpret the purpose of Parliament in incorporating
them within the definition. [224] This is therefore an example of purpovism by the Court to ensure
that  the  law  remains  connected  with  the  development  of  technology.  Brownsword,  however,
noted  that  whilst  this  case  was  going  through  the  Court,  there  was  a  significant  debate  in
Parliament surrounding Stem Cell research, and therefore, "it was perhaps not imperative that the
courts  seized on the regulatory disconnection as an opportunity  to launch a debate about the
regulatory position" . [225] Consequently, the Court moved too quickly in attempting to reconnect
the technology. Brownsword was of the view, however, that 'intelligent purposive interpretation' is
in line with the value of congruence that is central to the rule of law as long as it remains within
the spirit and intention of the regulation. [226] It is therefore worth recalling an earlier observation
in this paper that regulatory disconnection is not necessarily negative, although where it can cause
regulatory failure, it should be removed. The removal of regulatory disconnection should not be
'done at all costs', [227] the courts should use their judgement as to the timing of such attempts to
reconnect,  for  example  whether  there  is  a  debate  in  Parliament  surrounding  this  potential
disconnection and whether this is within the spirit of what Parliament had intended.
It is clear consequently that purposive interpretation could be a significant tool to enable the law
to  remain  connected  to  the  technology,  particularly  with  regards  to  the  LC  areas  and  the
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determination of accident. With regards to causation, and as noted above, it is clear that some are
of the view that case law would be able to manage causation issues. [228] Purposive interpretation
would allow the law to be adaptable, with the courts determining issues on a case by case basis,
although this would be a sacrifice to certainty and, as noted above, with the courts being required
to fill gaps in the law. Consequently, as noted above, a combination of both a purposive approach
as  well  as  some  soft  law  where  gaps  do  become  prevalent,  could  be  the  most  appropriate
approach to causation.  This  would provide both a  level  of  certainty  and flexibility,  and  would
further provide the necessary guidance for the courts when deciding cases. It is important to note
that whereas soft law in determining the definition of automated vehicle would be something,
which should be introduced in the near future, due to it providing the very focus of what the AEVA
2018 covers, the causation issue is something that would almost certainly be determined when
more is known about how the technology will operate in practice, and causation issues will only
likely become known. Moreover, it is suggested that the courts also use purposive interpretation in
terms of the definition of accident in light of the protection of third parties in conventional motor
insurance  law.  [229] The  fact  that  the  courts  already  use  such  an  approach,  albeit  in  a  non-
technological setting could make this approach more likely. However, a purposive approach would
mean at least a partial sacrifice of proactive law. Purposive interpretation also relies on cases going
to court, with which the facts which directly relate to the gaps in the law or where the law needs
updating. The time between the introduction of the legislation and the interpretive judgment from
case law could undoubtedly mean significant uncertainty.
Conclusion
This article has sought to provide a detailed evaluation of the AEVA 2018, with emphasis on issues
of proactive law and regulatory connection. It has found that the  AEVA 2018 was introduced in
advance of the introduction of automated vehicles to clarify the way in which third parties could
be compensated. The AEVA 2018 however leaves some issues open, such as the way in which the
insurer can reclaim from manufacturers and whether there are any defences available, as well as in
relation  to  definitions.  The  legislation  was  introduced  in  light  of  issues  such  as  regulatory
disconnection, both of which are concerns held in relation to technology law generally.
The AEVA 2018 is an area where the balance between ensuring regulatory connection and clarity is
extremely important, to ensure that both the legislation works and provides the necessary clarity
for  third  party  victim,  manufacturers  and  insurers.  The  AEVA  2018 has  attempted  to  remain
connected to the technology through the introduction of broad definitions and has attempted to
provide some clarity, although further clarity is required. It is submitted that in parts, this attempt
is valid, as the AEVA 2018 has provided room to manoeuvre later on, which it is submitted, would
be best served through the introduction of soft law. However, the fact that the LC has had to revisit
other  parts  of  the  AEVA 2018 such as  in  relation to causation and contributory negligence is
concerning, as it shows that the law has been rushed through with questions undoubtedly about
whether there are other parts of the AEVA 2018 which may need to be revisited.
It is submitted that the most likely and beneficial approaches in providing clarity in the AEVA 2018
particularly  in  relation  to  the  definition  of  automated  vehicle  is  through  soft  law,  particularly
through  harmonisation.  This  will  provide  the  flexibility  needed  when  defining  an  automated
vehicle and updating definitions, whilst being much simpler in light of fast paced technological
advancements, where the law may need to adapt quickly. However it is worth noting that there
will be some absence of certainty when soft law is introduced due to its flexible nature, although it
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is submitted, it could provide greater certainty than is currently provided. A purposive approach
would also ensure that causation issues are dealt with in a flexible way based on the situations
which arise before the courts, and this combined with soft law to fill any future causation gaps,
could be an appropriate solution. Nevertheless, it  is  worth noting that the introduction of any
regulation  needs  to  be  carefully  thought  through,  with  both  proactive  law  and  regulatory
connection considered, to ensure that any future law is as effective as it can be. 
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